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CINEMATIC PHILOSOPHY: 
EXPERIENTIAL AFFIRMATION IN MEMENTO 
Rafe McGregor 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) meets 
both conditions of Paisley Livingston’s bold thesis of cinema as philosophy.  I introduce the 
bold thesis and delineate my argument in terms of Aaron Smuts’ clarifications of 
Livingston’s conditions in §1.  §2 explains how Memento meets the results condition, which 
is concerned with the nature of the philosophical content, by employing a development of 
Berys Gaut’s conception of narrational confirmation that I designate experiential affirmation.  
In §3, I show that experiential affirmation is a function of cinematic depiction and therefore 
meets Livingston’s means condition, which is concerned with the capacities of the medium or 
art form.  I address two objections to my argument in §4: that it collapses into Thomas 
Wartenberg’s moderate pro-cinematic philosophy position; and Smuts’ claim that the 
audience enacts the philosophy, not the film.  I conclude with a brief commentary on the 
implications of my discussion of Memento for the broader relationship between film and 
philosophy.      
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a bewildering array of topics at the intersection of cinematic art and philosophical 
inquiry, and a variety of approaches within each topic.  The confusion arising from the 
multitude of approaches to a multitude of issues is reflected in the nomenclature employed to 
link philosophy and film: philosophy of film, philosophy in film, philosophy on film, 
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philosophy through film, film as philosophy, film-philosophy, and filmosophy – amongst 
others.  The issue is further complicated by the different meanings attached to both “film” 
and “philosophy” in the context of the exploration of the relationship between them.  I shall 
take film to refer to the art form of moving photorealistic pictures (whether photochemical or 
digital in origin), a film to be a work of cinema, and cinematic art as synonymous with the art 
form of film;1 and my claim is that Memento can meet both criteria of cinema as analytic 
philosophy in the bold thesis.2  Livingston states:  
 What I am calling the bold thesis is a conjunction of strong claims with regard to the 
 means and results conditions – namely, the idea that some films can make historically 
 innovative and independent contributions to philosophy by means exclusive to the 
 cinematic medium or art form.3 
He identifies the two conditions as follows: 
 (1) a conception of which sorts of exclusive capacities of the cinematic medium (or, 
 alternatively, the cinematic art form)4 are said to make a special contribution to 
 philosophy, and (2) claims about the nature of the latter contribution (such as strong 
 contention  about its originality, significance, or independence).  As (1) pertains to 
 means and (2) pertains to the end product, we can call these the means and results 
 conditions, respectively.5 
 
Smuts makes the following observation on the means condition:6    
the general spirit of this qualification is to distinguish between filmed presentations of 
philosophical debates, discussions, or arguments, and other more interesting 
candidates.7   
Smuts warns against the ‘super bold ’thesis, which holds that film can make a unique – rather 
than original – contribution to philosophical inquiry, such as Gilles Deleuze’s notion of 
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cinema’s ability to re-conceptualize time and movement.8  Although the features of Memento 
which I discuss suggest that the film does indeed do philosophy in a unique manner, I shall 
argue for the weaker thesis presented by Smuts: ‘that some films can make philosophical 
contributions by paradigmatic cinematic means.’9  Smuts notes that the purpose of the results 
condition ‘is to help distinguish between the mere illustration of a preexisting philosophical 
concept and the presentation of a new idea.’10  The results condition has two elements, 
innovation and independence, and Smuts is once again wary of setting standards which are 
too demanding: the innovation requirement is not that ‘all philosophical contributions made 
by films must be innovative, but that in principle films should be capable of innovation.’11  
Most philosophy lacks innovation in the sense of making an original contribution to the 
discipline and there is thus no need to demand this feature of film, as long as film has the 
potential to make such a contribution.  The independence element of Livingston’s thesis is a 
requirement that the philosophical contribution is not dependent upon a particular 
interpretation or philosophical context, i.e. imported into the film by the audience.12  I could, 
e.g., offer an interpretation of George Roy Hill’s Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (1969) 
based on Martin Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, particularly being-towards-death.  
Even if my interpretation provided fresh insights into the film, I would clearly be imposing 
Heidegger’s philosophy on the work, whereas a similar interpretation of Terrence Malick’s 
The Thin Red Line (1998) is less likely to be regarded as importation and more likely 
exegesis.13  I shall argue that Memento makes an innovative and independent contribution to 
philosophical knowledge by experiential affirmation, a means which is paradigmatic of the 
cinematic art form. 
 
2. Experiential Affirmation  
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In “Telling Stories: Narration, Emotion, and Insight in Memento”,14 Gaut sets out to show 
how Memento’s narration conditions cognitive and emotional responses.  He does not 
explicitly enter the cinematic philosophy debate as his concern is with the power of narration, 
and his paper an examination of the artistic properties of Memento’s narration.  Nonetheless, 
the notion of experiential confirmation which he advances indicates the manner in which at 
least one film can meet both the means and results condition of Livingston’s bold thesis.  
Gaut distinguishes between narrative (what is presented) and narration (how it is presented),15 
and selects Memento as his example for two reasons.  First, its narration is extremely 
complex.  I do not have space to explain the narrative structure of the film, suffice to say that 
it is far more intricate than reversed chronology.16  Despite this complexity, however, the 
attempt to structure the events in the correct sequence is ultimately rewarding and 
enlightening, unlike a film such as Alain Resnais’ Last Year at Marienbad (1961).17   
 
Second, the DVD release of the film contains an Easter Egg, which allows the work to be 
viewed in chronological order.  Gaut employs the contrast between the original and 
chronological versions – which have the same narrative, but different narration – in order to 
focus on the artistic properties of Memento’s narration.18  In the course of discussing these 
properties, Gaut mentions partial confirmation: the narration of Memento conditions 
responses 
by providing partial confirmation of the cognitive claims about the actual world that 
are explicit or implicit in the narrative, and thereby also providing partial justification 
for the emotional responses grounded on those claims.19 
Gaut maintains that assertions about the real world are embedded in the narrative and focuses 
on three:  
 (1) memory is unreliable,  
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 (2)  memory is partly determined by one’s aims, and  
 (3)  memory is essential to understanding.20   
The narration of the film provides partial confirmation of these claims, which he calls 
‘narrational confirmation’.21  Gaut then offers evidence for the narrational confirmation of 
assertions (1) to (3).   
 
Regarding (1), he claims that the film actually confirms the unreliability of memory through 
its narration.22  Memento’s narration is so complex that remembering the sequence in which 
the events are presented and the actual sequence of the events is extremely difficult.  This 
may seem unconvincing to someone who has not watched the work, but Gaut cites both 
Christopher Nolan’s experience of not always knowing which scene is next23 and his own;24 
the former is based on more than a thousand viewings, the latter on more than thirty.  On a 
mere dozen viewings, I am in complete agreement, and Gaut’s claim that Memento is ‘one of 
the most narratively complex artworks ever produced’ is no exaggeration.25   
 
Gaut fails to demonstrate the operation of narrational confirmation for (2).26  The impaired 
memory of the protagonist, Leonard (Guy Pearce), is indeed explained by his aims, which – 
depending on one’s interpretation of the film, are: (a) his genuine – albeit flawed – attempts 
to avenge his wife’s murder, (b) his use of his wife’s murder by others as an excuse to 
indulge his own love of killing, or (c) his attempts to repress his memory of murdering of his 
wife himself.  There is no strong parallel between fiction and reality here as the viewer is 
simply trying to make sense of the narrative.  Even though there is evidence for all three 
interpretations, the viewer has no vested interest in a particular interpretation to the extent 
that this interest determines one’s memory of events in any way comparable to Leonard’s 
self-manipulation in the film.  What is interesting about Gaut’s failure to show (2) is that it 
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shows the strength of (1) and (3), i.e. (2) shows the real difference between deriving a 
proposition from the evidence offered by a film (memory is partly determined by one’s aims) 
and experiencing the narrational confirmation of a proposition (memory is unreliable).     
 
The narrational confirmation of (3) is paradigmatic.  Leonard has a severe case of 
anterograde amnesia, and the narration of the film is such the color scenes are shown in 
reverse order; i.e. the viewer does not know what has happened immediately prior to the 
events depicted.  Gaut claims that Memento forces epistemic identification with Leonard on 
the viewer by placing her in a similar epistemic situation, and that this epistemic 
identification results in a more powerful affective identification (imagining what Leonard is 
feeling) and empathy (feeling what Leonard is feeling).27  The similarity of the epistemic 
situations of Leonard and the viewer provide narrational confirmation of the importance of 
memory to understanding because:  
we not only grasp that Leonard cannot interpret the situation correctly because of his 
incapacity, but we are also made to experience through the narrational strategy that we 
cannot grasp the situation correctly if [we] are deprived of the information that 
memory would normally provide.28 
    
Gaut concludes that narrational confirmation is ‘partial confirmation’ and ‘a kind of 
experiential confirmation’.29  The latter term refers to the fact that a work of film can provide 
a particular experience for a viewer.  In the case of Memento it is the narration which 
facilitates the viewer’s experience of (1) memory as unreliable, and (3) memory as essential 
to understanding.  According to Gaut, therefore, the experience of watching the film is an 
experience which confirms (1) and (3):30 ‘narrational confirmation is a real phenomenon, and 
it is one whose existence is disclosed by detailed attention to Memento.’31  I shall employ the 
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term experiential confirmation as opposed to partial or narrational confirmation, and I take 
Gaut to have demonstrated that: Memento provides experiential confirmation of the cognitive 
claims about the actual world that are explicit or implicit in the work.  I shall now show that 
Gaut’s claim is in fact too weak, and that Memento provides more than experiential 
confirmation of (1) and (3). 
 
Gaut’s use of the word confirmation implies that the assertions in (1) and (3) are already 
known to him, i.e. the knowledge they yield is not new.  The absence of innovation is not a 
cinematic feature of Memento, however, because it has potential application to all means by 
which philosophical knowledge is communicated.  As Smuts has pointed out, relatively few 
contributions to philosophy are innovative in ‘the strong sense of the term.’32  The question of 
whether a particular method is capable of presenting new ideas or restricted to the illustration 
of pre-existing ideas can therefore be asked of all means of philosophical communication, 
including – e.g. – thought experiments.  In her defenses of thought experiments as 
indispensable tools in science and philosophy, Tamar Gendler discusses (1*) the thought 
experiment Galileo employed to refute Aristotle’s claim that natural speed is directly 
proportional to weight,33 and an example of her own invention: 
 (2*)  Think about your next-door neighbor’s living room, and ask yourself the  
  following questions: If you painted its walls bright green, would that clash 
  with the current carpet, or complement it?  If you removed all its furniture, 
  could four elephants fit comfortably inside?  If you removed all but one of the 
  elephants, would there be enough space to ride a bicycle without tipping as 
  you turned?34 
For the majority of readers, (1*) will not provide new knowledge, but (2*) will: where most 
contemporary readers probably already know that natural speed is not directly proportional to 
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weight, Gendler has selected (2*) precisely because it is an unlikely way to conceive of living 
space.35  If I am conducting (2*), it seems highly unlikely that someone else has already 
considered my neighbor’s living space in terms of its capacity to house elephants and 
cyclists.  If not, or if someone else has in fact conceived of the space in this way but has not 
communicated the information to me, then Gendler maintains that the thought experiment 
would have produced a new, justified, true belief.36  If, however, that person – perhaps my 
neighbor’s other neighbor – had already communicated the information to me, then 
undertaking the thought experiment myself would only produce a justified, true belief.    
 
Thought experiments are clearly capable of presenting new ideas, but the novelty of the 
knowledge provided is dependent upon the reader rather than the thought experiment itself.  
Gaut refers to (1) and (3) as experiential confirmation, but in doing so he assumes that 
Memento’s audience already knows that memory is both unreliable and essential to 
understanding.  He is probably correct, but if a particular viewer did not believe that – e.g. – 
memory was essential to understanding, then watching Memento would provide more than 
experiential confirmation: the justified, true belief formed in virtue of watching the film 
would (also) be new.  The difference between confirmation and affirmation has nothing to do 
with Memento and everything to do with the audience and there is no reason to restrict the 
film to the illustration of pre-existing ideas.  For the appropriately uninformed audience, the 
experience of Memento will produce new, justified, true beliefs.  In such cases, the film 
would have provided experiential affirmation of a proposition or assertion.  It is important to 
note that the reliance upon the audience for the distinction between confirmation and 
affirmation is precisely the same for thought experiments: Galileo’s thought experiment 
provides confirmation for Gendler (who already knows that natural speed is not directly 
proportional to weight), but affirmation for an Aristotelian (who does not).   
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I shall define experiential affirmation as: the production of new, justified, true belief by the 
employment of cinematic imagery to stimulate the imagination.  There is evidence for 
experiential affirmation in at least one work of film as Memento provides experiential 
affirmation that memory is both unreliable and essential to understanding.  The bold thesis 
poses the question of whether a film can: make innovative and independent contributions to 
philosophy by paradigmatically cinematic means.  My answer is that by means of 
experiential affirmation, Memento makes an innovative and independent contribution to 
philosophical knowledge.  The contribution is not dependent upon interpretation or context, 
and although the ideas presented are not innovative in the strong sense of the term, there is 
nothing about Memento qua work of cinema which precludes the presentation of new ideas; 
the film therefore meets Livingston’s results condition.  In the next section I shall offer 
evidence that experiential affirmation is a paradigmatically cinematic means of contributing 
to philosophical knowledge.         
 
3. Cinematic Depiction 
 
Elsewhere, I have discussed the conflict between the significance accorded to the role of the 
imagination in engaging with works of art and the fact that many films appear to leave very 
little to the imagination.37  The same qualities which restrict the scope of the imagination – 
the potential for perceptual realism in work of cinematic art – are also those which facilitate 
the operation of experiential affirmation in Memento.  In §1 I identified “film” as the art form 
of moving photorealistic pictures, and in §2 I described  “experiential affirmation” as 
producing new, justified, true belief by the employment of cinematic imagery.  “Cinematic 
imagery” is not, however, restricted to moving photorealistic pictures, such as one finds in 
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The Birth of a Nation (D.W. Griffith, 1915).  Since the nineteen-twenties, cinematic images 
have been both audible and colored, and the experience of watching Butch Cassidy and the 
Sundance Kid is consequently much closer to the experience of perceiving people, places, 
and events in real life than Griffith’s prototypical feature film.38  Kendall Walton 
characterizes the imaginings authorized by depictive (as opposed to descriptive) 
representations as rich and vivid.39  He uses “rich” to refer to the amount of detail conveyed, 
and “vivid” to the level of realism the experience involves, i.e. the ease with which one is 
able to make-believe the fiction.40  As Walton does not discuss film in great detail, I shall 
turn to Gregory Currie for an explanation of cinematic depiction.41 
 
Currie begins with a general theory of depiction which holds that pictures are realistic by 
being like the things they depict.42  A written description of a horse can be entirely accurate, 
but the experience of reading it is entirely unlike the visual experience of seeing a horse.  
Pictures differ in that recognition is by spatial features:  
my visual capacity to recognize a horse is the capacity to associate some visual 
feature of what I see with the concept horse, thereby enabling me to bring what I see 
under that concept.43 
The horse and the picture of the horse have spatial features in common.  While the font and 
typeface of a written description of a horse do not affect one’s recognition, spatial changes in 
a picture might cause one to mistake a horse for a zebra or a unicorn.  Inherent in this 
capacity for visual recognition is the mind’s ability to discriminate between a real horse and a 
pictorial representation thereof.44  Looking at a photographic representation of a horse is 
realistic because it deploys the same object-recognition capacity, and object-recognition 
causes natural generativity,45 which means that – generally – one can recognize a picture of X 
if one can recognize X itself.46  Currie holds that where representation displays natural 
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generativity it is perceptually realistic, and that an absence of natural generativity results in a 
lack of perceptual realism.   
 
He maintains that film is distinct in ‘its portrayal of time by means of time’,47 distinguishing 
three kinds of temporality: the temporality of the work, the temporality of the observer’s 
experience of the work, and the temporality of what the work represents.  All representational 
art forms are representationally temporal; literature, cinema, theatre, and music are also 
experientially temporal; and cinema, theatre, and music are additionally work-temporal.48  ‘It 
is the default setting for cinematic interpretation that the representation of duration in cinema 
is automorphic’.49  Thus even in a film which is as complex as Memento, one should assume 
that the time it takes Leonard to discuss the unreliability of memory with Teddy (Joe 
Pantoliano) over lunch is about a minute and a half, which is the actual time it takes to watch 
the conversation occur on screen.  If the duration of the work differs from the duration of the 
representation – as in Memento, where a story which takes place over approximately forty-
eight hours is represented in a work of just under two hours – there will be visual cues to 
indicate the difference.               
 
Currie believes that the representation of space is more difficult than time due to the 
representation of three dimensional objects on a two dimensional screen.50  ‘In cinema, 
spatial properties of representations represent spatial properties of the things represented.’51  
Spatial representation is homomorphic rather than automorphic: the spatial properties of 
cinematic representations function automorphically for relative spatial properties and 
nonautomorphically for absolute spatial properties.52  The difference in height between the 
cinematic representations of Leonard and Teddy will therefore be a ratio of the difference 
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between the actors, but it will be only coincidental if the image of Leonard appears as 1.8 
meters tall (Pearce’s height) on the screen.   
 
The combination of natural generativity, the automorphic representation of time, and the 
homomorphic representation of space leads to Currie to conclude that film ‘has the capacity 
for realism not merely in its depiction of objects but in its depiction of spatial and temporal 
relations between those objects.’53  This perceptual realism admits of degrees and has been 
greatly enhanced by the introduction of color and sound.  Color makes object-recognition 
more effortless and the addition of a soundtrack which corresponds to the visual 
representation brings a new perceptual dimension to cinematic experience, making the 
experience so much more like reality.  Contrast, e.g., the cinematic experience of the 
abolitionist lecture in The Birth of a Nation with the cinematic experience of the marshal 
attempting to raise a posse in Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid.  For my purpose in this 
paper, I shall take cinematic depiction to be: representation by means of moving, audible 
photorealistic pictures.54 
 
Cinematic depiction means that films can, in Walton’s terms, be ‘be understood without 
decoding and inference’.55  The depictive realism in films is greater than all the other 
representational art forms.  Photographs tend to be more realistic than paintings, but 
photographs do not move or make a noise.  The closest art form in terms of realism is theatre, 
but film is more perceptually realistic still, and requires less decoding.  If one watches a 
performance of Richard III, e.g., one typically perceives two actors pretending to duel and 
imagines the Battle of Bosworth Field raging around them.  In contrast, when one watches 
Saving Private Ryan (Steven Spielberg, 1998), one perceives images of the actors apparently 
engaged in a real battle.  The richness and vividness of the cinematic imagery is so great that 
13 
 
very little is left to the imagination, and one seems to perceive precisely the sights and sounds 
of Omaha Beach on D Day.56  My thesis is that the experiential affirmation in Memento is a 
function of cinematic depiction, but as cinematic depiction is not unique to the film, the 
question of whether other films can do philosophy by means of experiential affirmation 
arises.  I discuss this possibility briefly in §5.   
 
The element of cinematic depiction which plays the most significant role in experiential 
affirmation in Memento is the automorphic representation of time, specifically work-
temporality.  The complexity of the narration makes it appear as if the viewer’s memory – 
like Leonard’s – is unreliable.  This experience is exacerbated by the fact that one finds 
oneself in the same position as Leonard with each successive color scene: where Leonard has 
forgotten what has just happened, the viewer has not yet seen that part of the film due to the 
reversed chronology.  Leonard’s confusion is thus mirrored by one’s own, and one learns (or 
is reminded) that memory for Leonard and knowledge of what has occurred previously for 
the viewer, is necessary for understanding.  Perhaps this experiential affirmation could be 
achieved by any work which was experientially temporal and had a sufficiently complex 
narration, e.g. a novelization of Memento,57 and is not therefore a feature of cinematic 
depiction.  
 
There are three problems with this view.  First, the experiential temporality of novels is such 
that they are (usually) not intended to be read in a single sitting.  The time it would take to 
read the novel from first page to last, generally a dozen or more hours spread over one or 
more days, would alter the effect that the narration has on the viewer.  Typically, if one 
comes back to a novel after a few day’s absence, one does not remember all the salient points 
and flicks back to refresh one’s memory.  The affirmation that memory is unreliable is diluted 
14 
 
and diminished.  Although one could flick back and forth for clarification in Memento, the 
film is intended to be watched in one sitting, from the first second to the last.  One 
experiences affirmation that one’s own memory is unreliable because one cannot remember 
what has happened an hour ago – or, more likely, what has happened a few minutes 
beforehand.  Work-temporality is thus a crucial element of the experiential affirmation.  
Second, there are elements of the film which could not be represented – at least as effectively 
– in another art form.  Aside from the standard flashbacks in Memento, there are several very 
quick flashes which may or may not be accurate memories of Leonard’s:58 one shot shows 
him in a mental institution, another suggests his wife was diabetic, another suggests he may 
have killed her violently.  It is difficult to imagine how the effects of these brief shots, 
appearing in the manner in which they do in the film, could be replicated in a non-cinematic 
narrative representation.   
 
Finally, I think that the ease of engaging with the cinematic depiction allows the viewer to 
focus on the complexity of the narration.  The film has been created so as to reward attention 
to the artistic properties of its narration in a particular manner.  Lengthy descriptions of the 
people, places, and events would interfere with the complexity of the presentation of the 
sequence of events, but without detailed descriptions the reader could not be expected to 
make sense of the story.  When one watches the film, and here it is significant that the central 
story – the “present” of forty-eight-odd hours which is shown in scenes with reversed 
chronological order – is in color, the perceptual realism means that one is able to instantly 
absorb a large amount of audio-visual information about the characters, setting, and action.  
No lengthy descriptions are required as sufficient information is presented for the viewer to 
follow the narrative (albeit with great difficulty).  The color scenes comprise just over three 
quarters of the film, and – for the reasons outlined above – require less decoding: they are 
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more like real perception than the black and white scenes, and the audience can focus on 
attempting to make sense of the plot while experiencing the affirmation that memory is 
essential to understanding.  My claim is thus that the experiential affirmation by means of 
which Memento contributes to philosophical knowledge is a paradigmatically cinematic 
means as it is a function of the depictive representation peculiar to cinema.  Memento 
therefore meets the results and means conditions of the bold thesis.  I shall now consider two 
objections to my argument.   
 
4. Objections 
 
Wartenberg characterizes his view of cinematic philosophy as the ‘moderate pro-cinematic 
philosophy position’.59  Unlike the stronger pro-cinematic philosophy position held by 
Stanley Cavell and Stephen Mulhall, Wartenberg restricts the ability of cinema to do 
philosophy to three ways: illustrating a position, presenting a thought experiment, or 
performing a cinematic experiment.60  The first and third of these are not relevant to my 
discussion of Memento.  The third is confined to avante garde, experimental films, e.g. 
Empire (Andy Warhol, 1965), which test the boundaries of the art form.  The first is not 
paradigmatic of film: Wartenberg discusses illustrated books,61 and arguments could be 
offered for literary or dramatic illustrations.  He uses The Matrix (Andy Wachowski & Larry 
Wachowski, 1999) as an example of a film that presents a thought experiment,62 specifically 
the deception hypothesis, originally proposed by Descartes with his evil demon or spirit.63  
Wartenberg contrasts The Matrix with the hypothetical film The Matron, where the audience 
is aware that the fictional world is a deception.64  Unlike the latter, in the former: 
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the filmmakers disrupt our experience of the film world as well, providing us viewers 
with an actual experience (albeit of a fictional world) in which we recognize that our 
senses have been deceiving us about the nature of reality.65 
Wartenberg notes that the ability to deceive an audience is not limited to film, but that what is 
unique about The Matrix is that it ‘deceives viewers about their perceptual beliefs’.66  This 
perceptual deception is sufficient for the film performing a thought experiment and therefore 
doing philosophy.  The objection to my position is that the experiential affirmation I have 
attributed to Memento is an example of Memento presenting a thought experiment and is thus 
better suited to Wartenberg’s moderate pro-cinematic philosophy position than Livingston’s 
bold thesis.  
 
The comparison between The Matrix and The Matron is interesting because it parallels the 
comparison between Memento and the Easter Egg version, highlighting particularly relevant 
features.  The difference between The Matrix and The Matron is that the former has an 
experiential element: like Thomas Anderson/Neo (Keanu Reeves), the viewer initially 
believes that life in the matrix is reality in the fictional world of the film.  Like Neo, 
therefore, the viewer is deceived.  In The Matrix, one has the experience of being deceived; in 
The Matron one has the experience of perceiving someone else being deceived.  In this 
respect, it seems as if The Matrix is similar to Memento: just as the viewer has the experience 
of unreliable memory in the latter, one is deceived in the former.  If The Matrix produces 
new, justified, true belief – e.g., the belief in the possibility of the real world being an illusion 
– by the employment of cinematic imagery to stimulate the imagination, then it may also be 
an example of experiential affirmation.   
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If so, however, The Matrix is a far more controversial example than Memento.  In the former, 
Neo’s deception – and that of the audience – is relatively short-lived.  As soon as Neo takes 
the red pill he escapes the illusory matrix for the reality in the film, a world where human 
beings and machines are at war.  In contrast, Memento’s experiential affirmation is sustained 
throughout the film and the full force of the claim that memory is essential to understanding 
is only realised at the very end, when Leonard’s self-deception is revealed.  The difference in 
the intensity of the experience is significant as it marks the difference between the 
presentation of a thought experiment and making an innovative contribution to philosophical 
knowledge, i.e. meeting the results condition of the bold thesis.   
 
It is clear that The Matrix does present a thought experiment, namely the evil demon.  It is 
equally clear that the presentation lacks innovation, as the film merely presents Descartes 
thought experiment in a contemporary setting, employing it as a plot device in a science 
fiction film.  The use of the thought experiment as a device may be an artistic merit, but the 
philosophy is not innovative – precisely because it takes a famous thought experiment and re-
presents it.  Memento does not re-present a thought experiment.  Although there have been 
numerous films with a-chronological narratives, none have used precisely this method nor – I 
propose – exhibited the degree of complexity evident in Memento, both of which are essential 
to the experiential affirmation for which I have argued.  If there is a relation between 
Memento and thought experiments then that relation is not one of presentation or illustration, 
but constitution: the film is a thought experiment.  My thesis does not therefore collapse into 
the moderate pro-cinematic philosophy position.   
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This brings me to the second objection.  Smuts, referring to Wartenberg and others, claims 
that the most popular argument for film as philosophy is that ‘some films can function as’ 
thought experiments.67  He uses The Matrix to show what is wrong with this approach: 
 The problem with the thought experiment argument for film as philosophy 
 is that it does not show how films could do philosophy, much less innovative 
 philosophy, only how we could do philosophy with a film.68 
The idea seems to be that while one watches Neo penetrate through the illusion to the reality 
in the film, it is the viewer who must take the step to pose a question along the lines of: how 
do I know I am not living in a matrix myself?  The Matrix does not thus invite one to imagine 
that the real world is illusory, only to imagine that Neo’s world is illusory, and if one 
extrapolates from the work to the world, then one is doing the philosophy, performing the 
thought experiment, oneself.  The objection to my position is that if Memento constitutes a 
thought experiment then it is the audience rather than the film which is doing the philosophy.  
 
There are two problems with this objection.  First, I employed thought experiments – the two 
discussed by Gendler – as an analogy in order to show that the difference between 
confirmation and affirmation was dependent upon the knowledge of the observer.  My 
argument for Memento contributing to philosophy by means of experiential affirmation is not 
therefore reliant upon Memento constituting a thought experiment.  Second, while Smuts is 
correct about The Matrix requiring the viewer to perform the experiment, this is not true of 
Memento.  In Memento, the complexity of the narration demonstrates that the viewer’s 
memory is unreliable and that the viewer’s memory is essential to understanding.  One knows 
that Leonard’s memory is unreliable due to his anterograde amnesia, and one perceives the 
effects that this unreliability has on his understanding.  But the experiential affirmation which 
operates in the film goes beyond the viewer’s experience of perceiving Leonard’s unreliable 
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memory: the complex narration shows how unreliable one’s own memory is, and one 
understands the partial confusion of the first viewing of the film as a result of this failure of 
memory, i.e. one realizes that memorizing the correct chronology is essential to 
understanding the narrative.  This is why I rejected the second of Gaut’s claims in §2, that 
memory is partly determined by one’s aims, because while that is certainly true of Leonard, it 
is not true of the viewer.   
 
One can now see why The Matrix and Memento are not equivalent: Memento plays with the 
viewer’s memory in a way that The Matrix could not possibly play with our perception of 
reality.  When I watch The Matrix, I can imagine that the cinema theatre and film are just 
illusions in a similar manner to which I imaginatively engage with the film, but I am not 
compelled to do so.  If the film inspires me to perform Descartes’ thought experiment then 
Smuts is quite correct and it is me, rather than The Matrix, that does the philosophy.  When I 
watch Memento, however, there is no choice: if I engage with the film I have an experience 
which affirms the unreliability of my memory and the consequences of that unreliability.  If 
experiential affirmation was understood in terms of thought experiments, Smuts’ objection to 
the thought experiment argument for cinematic philosophy would thus still fail against 
Memento. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
My thesis is that Memento does philosophy by meeting both the results and means conditions 
of Livingston’s bold thesis.  I have identified experiential affirmation as the manner in which 
Memento does philosophy, and proposed that experiential affirmation is paradigmatically 
cinematic as it is a function of the (potential for) perceptual realism of cinematic depiction.  
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Even if my explanation of the cause of experiential affirmation is flawed, Memento 
nonetheless meets the two conditions, and remains an example of a film which does 
philosophy.  I have furthermore shown that my thesis does not collapse into Wartenberg’s 
moderate pro-cinematic philosophy position and that it is not susceptible to Smuts’ argument 
against film doing philosophy by means of thought experiments.  In §3 I explained the 
experiential affirmation in Memento as a function of cinematic depiction and raised the 
question of whether other works of cinematic art – works which are also characterized by 
cinematic depiction – do philosophy by the same means.  I was dismissive of The Matrix as a 
candidate, but I do not wish to imply that Memento is the only film which makes a 
contribution to philosophical knowledge by means of experiential affirmation or the only film 
which meets both conditions for the bold thesis.  I think, e.g., that Stanley Kubrick’s Eyes 
Wide Shut (1999) might do philosophy in a similar manner, and Alessandro Giovannelli has 
advanced a convincing argument for the operation of experiential identification in the film.69  
Like Gaut, Giovannelli does not enter the cinematic philosophy debate, but – again, like Gaut 
– his argument could easily be extrapolated in that direction.   
 
My claim is, however, deliberately restricted to Memento.  Gaut notes an identical restriction 
on his claims about narrative properties, i.e. he does not rule out that other works of film may 
have the same properties, but is wary of generalizing.70  For Gaut this means both that critical 
attention to the detail of a particular film can disclose its philosophical significance, and that 
one should be wary of inductive arguments from the properties of a particular film to the 
properties of cinematic art in general.  The focus on criticism and particularism is echoed by 
Wartenberg in his discussion of the relationship between film and thought experiments:   
 I don’t think that a priori arguments about the possibility of film’s ability to present 
 philosophical thought experiments will settle the issue.  What’s needed is a critical 
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 assessment of the interpretations of specific films that I and others have offered in 
 support of the idea that certain films actually present philosophical thought 
 experiments.71 
I have only shown that a particular work of film – Memento – meets the conditions for the 
bold thesis.  Despite my identification of cinematic depiction as crucial to experiential 
affirmation, the question of whether other films do philosophy by the same means should be 
answered on a film-by-film basis.  To my conclusion that Memento does philosophy, I 
therefore add the caveat that there are no general theories or principles for meeting the 
conditions of the bold thesis which can be derived from my analysis.72 
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